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I. INTRODUCTION

Beer trademarks have become perhaps the most contentious of
battlegrounds in an industry that built itself on a community of
collaboration and camaraderie. The growing pains are understandable,
however. The United States has witnessed a record number of craft
breweries in recent years and the numbers only continue to rise.
According to the Brewers Association, a not-for-profit trade
association dedicated to small and independent American beer, as of
November 2015, the country boasted a historic high of 4,144
breweries. 2 In terms of trademark competition, that is not merely 4,144
Stacy Allura Hostetter started her legal career in the craft beer industry with
1
all their transactional needs including intellectual property, contracts, licensing,

business law, and regulatory compliance. Stacy co-authored Brew Law 101: A Guide
to Opening a Brewery in 2015 and has presented at local, state, and national
conferences with regards to the legal challenges faced by small businesses in highly
regulated industries on topics ranging from trademark disputes to distribution
relationships. Stacy now proudly serves the California cannabis industry at the Law
Offices of Omar Figueroa with similar matters.
Press Release, Brewers Association, The Year in Beer: U.S. Brewery Count
2
2015),
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4,144
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brewery names that need to be avoided if you are thinking of joining
the sudsy ranks, but another ten individual beer names per brewery at
least - and many breweries have much deeper portfolios than that.
Puns seemed to be the first casualties in the war of words as breweries
swept up every conceivable beer and hop pun imaginable.3 But even
as the beer-themed linguistic well ran dry for puns, brewers discovered
that less beer-specific names had issues as well. The crux of the issue
is that beer and other alcoholic beverages are all treated as "related
goods" for trademark purposes. This is so despite beer existing in a
different international class than other alcoholic beverages in the
trademark classification system used around the globe (beer belongs to
International Class 32, while wine, spirits, and every other form of
alcoholic beverage belongs to International Class 33).4 Thus, when
analyzing a potential mark, brewers must take into account not only
the ever-increasing number of craft breweries and their everlengthening beer lists, but also wineries, distilleries, kombucha
manufacturers, sake manufacturers, and so forth.
By way of reference, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office currently shows 27,303 live applications and registrations for
trademarks in International Class 32 in connection with beer products
and no less than 62,746 live applications and registrations in
International Class 33 for other alcoholic beverages.' But even those
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/the-year-in-beer-u-s-brewerycount-reaches-all-time-high-of-4144/.
Simon Berger, Craft Breweries areRunning Out ofPun Names for Beers,
Resort to Suing Each Other Instead, THE ROOSTER (July 26, 2016),
http://www.therooster.com/blog/craft-breweries-run-out-pun-names-beers-resortsuing-each-other; Sara Randazzo, As Hop Puns Run Dry, Craft Beer Trademark
Litigation Heats Up, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 11, 2016, 11:57 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/07/11/as-hop-puns-run-dry-craft-beer-trademarklitigation-heats-up/; Alastair Bland, CraftBrewers are Running Out of Names and
Into Legal Spats, NPR: THE SALT
(Jan.
5,
2015,
9:08 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/
01/05/369445171 /craft-brewers-are-running-out-of-names-and-into-legal-spats;
Andy Crouch, The Great Beer Trademark Wars: Brewers Head to the Courts to
Protect Their Brands, ALL ABOUT
BEER MAG.,
April
30, 2014,
http://allaboutbeer.com/article/beer-trademarks/.
4
World Intellectual Prop. Org., International Classification of Goods and
Services for the Purposes of Registration of Marks (10th ed. 2011).
United States Patent and Trademark Office, TESS (Aug. 1, 2016). First
search: (032)[IC], (beer)[GS], and (live)[LD]. Second search: (033)[IC] and

(live)[LD].
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numbers barely paint the picture. Consumer-driven beer tracking
website Beeradvocate currently has over 300,000 beer brands in its
database alone. 6 While the industry may have started with a team effort
attitude rooted in opposition to the handful of mega-breweries that
consolidated market share, the trademark drought has led even craft
breweries to legal spats and litigation in recent years.' So with everincreasing competition and so many monikers already claimed, it is no
wonder that a distinct trademark is worth a premium. But where to
turn?
One category of marks that is relatively untapped is the immoral,
indecent, and obscene. The landscape of the moral low-brow has seen
little action to date, though likely not for lack of desire. Rather, legal
barriers have prevented brewers and other alcohol manufacturers from
such marks. Until recently, just like any business, trademark law
prevented the registration of marks that are "immoral . . . scandalous
... or matter which may disparage .. .persons,. . . institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols" on the federal database of the United States Patent
& Trademark Office. 8 While that particular prohibition may now be at
an end, given the recent decision in In re Tam, 9 brewers must still
contend with alcohol labeling laws at both the state and federal level
that incorporate similar prohibitions to those imposed by trademark
law.' 0
Though the prohibitions were rooted in different areas of law
alcohol and trademark - the principal and the effect are the same. Now
that free speech concerns have been implicated in the one, it bears
examination whether the same analysis can and should be applied to
6

Todd, Comment to, The GreatBeer Trademark Wars: Brewers Head to the

Courts to Protect Their Brands, ALL ABOUT BEER MAG. (July 11,
2017).https://www.beeradvocate.com/community/threads/how-many-differentThough,
beers-are-there.525578/http://allaboutbeer.com/article/beer-trademarks/.
admittedly, many foreign beers that may not be distributed in the United States are
listed as well.
Samantha Drake, Craft Beers Recent Spate ofLawsuits Has Beer Drinkers
Hopping Mad, QUARTZ (Jan. 13, 2016), http://qz.com/589208/craft-beers-recentspate-of-lawsuits-has-beer-drinkers-hopping-mad/; Jonathan Kauffinan, Lagunitas
Brewing Sues SierraNevada Over IPA Label, INSIDE SCOOP SF GATE (Jan. 13, 2015,
12:43 PM), http://insidescoopsfsfgate.com/blog/2015/01/13/lagunitas-brewingsues-sierra-nevada-over-ipa-label/.
9

15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).

10

See generally id.
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the other. Accordingly, this piece will briefly examine the structure of
the trademark law prohibiting registration of obscene marks, the recent
case law that has struck down that prohibition, and the structure of the
alcohol labeling laws. The article will conclude with an analysis of
whether the Tam decision can be applied to the alcohol labeling laws
and thus open new avenues to the beer branding pundits of the nation.
II. PROHIBITION OF OBSCENE TRADEMARKS AND IN RE TAM

In 2011, Simon Shiao Tam, a member of the Asian-American
dance-rock band "The Slants," sought federal registration for the
band's name." However, the examining attorney refused the
application based on a finding that the band name disparaged people
of Asian descent and was therefore not registrable. The test is twopronged: the mark's meaning is (1) likely referring to identifiable
persons and (2) disparages a substantial composite of the referenced
group.' 2 The band, itself peopled by individuals of such descent,
maintained that they were re-appropriating the term for the benefit of
the Asian community and thus appealed the examining attorney's
decision.' 3 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the
original refusal however, based on the aforementioned test and a
throwaway reference to In re McGinley for the proposition that
because the band could still call itself "The Slants," the refusal of a
registered trademark did not implicate speech rights.14 Unperturbed,
the band appealed again, this time with a First Amendment challenge."
Sitting judiciary Judge Moore initially confirmed the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board's decision but relied on an en banc hearing for
a final decision which ultimately held the disparagement provision
unconstitutional.' 6 The court found the provision to be both content
and viewpoint discriminatory, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.' 7
Once under the spotlight of strict scrutiny, the provision was found
wanting constitutionally since it singled out disparaging speech as a
II

Id. at 1331.

12

See id.

13

See id. at 1358.
See In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313 (citing In re McGinley, 660

14

F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
15
16
17

See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568-69, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.
See id. at 1334-37.

THE PRIVILEGE OFOBSCENITY

2018]1

103

subject matter and continued to discriminate based among the
viewpoints contained therein.' 8
The court then proceeded to reject the government's various
defenses including their reliance on In re McGinley, their
characterization of the provision as a regulation of commercial speech
subject to lower scrutiny, and their characterization of registration as a
"subsidy" or "governent speech" outside the bounds of the First
Amendment.1 9 In doing so, the court found federal registration to
bestow widely recognized, "truly significant and financially valuable
benefits upon markholders." 20 The government's denial of those
benefits, in turn, chilled free speech by "create[ing] a serious
disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem
offensive or disparaging." 2 1
While the Tam opinion expressly did not touch section 2(a)'s
prohibitions on immoral or scandalous marks, the holding was
22
extended to such soon thereafter in In re Brunetti. Thus, Tam's
rationale is currently applicable to all marks submitted to the USPTO
that would have otherwise been denied based on obscenity grounds.
This moral breathing room benefits alcohol manufacturers little
however in the current legal regime. This is because both federal and
state labeling laws currently prohibit the use of scandalous
representations, whether through language or pictorial representations,
on alcohol labels independent of the recently overturned trademark
law.
III. PROHIBITION OF OBSCENE ALCOHOL LABELS

While the trademark laws applicable to alcohol are the same as
those applied to any other goods or services, federal and state
governments have both placed labeling regulations upon alcohol that
control how an alcohol manufacturer may brand and market its
product. Since the trademark laws are universally applied, the ban on
registration of scandalous and obscene marks has perhaps been less
noticeable to alcohol manufacturers since it was a universal
18
20

See id. at 1335-37.
Id. at 1333-34, 1337-38, 1345-48.
Id.

21

Id.

22

In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

19
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requirement anyhow. If such prohibitions will not be enforced
universally anymore, the independent labeling laws requiring the same
become a unique burden to the alcohol industry. It seems fitting then,
that as the country reevaluates the propriety of such trademark laws on
a general sense, the same logic might apply to invalidate labeling laws
prohibiting scandalous marks.
A. FederalLabeling Laws
The federal government regulates alcohol labeling through the
Alcohol & Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau ("TTB").2 3 The TTB
requires any sealed container of alcoholic beverages that crosses state
lines to bear an approved label.24 This rule applies to bottles, cans, and
kegs.2 5 Without an approved label, the alcohol is not allowed to travel
in interstate commerce - a practice that is not only commonplace, but
invaluable to an expanding business that hopes to be more than a purely
regional commodity.
The labeling laws mandate a variety of information, most of
which is aimed at keeping potential consumers apprised of factual,
nutritionally relevant information such as the percentage of alcohol by
volume, the type of beer, and so on. Specifically, the primarylabel on
an alcohol container, which would include a keg collar if applicable, is
required to indicate, among other things, the brand name of the beer. 26
Though it need not be placed on the primary label, the familiar
government warning pictured below on the top right of a Modern
Times Lost Horizon label, must also be displayed on the container and
in an exceptionally specific format.27

23

27 C.F.R. § 7 (2016).

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at § 7.22.
Id. § 16.20-22 (mandating the inclusion of "GOVERNMENT WARNING:
(1) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages
during pregnancy because of the risk ofbirth defects. (2) Consumption ofalcoholic
beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause
health problems." on all beer containers).
27
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This warning must be so designed as to be readily legible "under
ordinary conditions" and has requirements about background colors
and the method of affixation. 2 8
All of this mandated information is akin to that used with other
foodstuffs however and, again, is aimed at informing consumers about
the nutritional impact the consumable is likely to have upon them. The
rules are not aimed at viewpoints however. 29 Where the TTB laws
begin to tread interesting water is with prohibitions against labels that
These
create certain impressions upon potential consumers.
prohibitions preclude labels that create a false or misleading
impression, disparage a competitor's products, simulate government
approval or involvement, feature unsubstantiated health claims, and
3 0
statements that indicate the beverage is intoxicating. Many of these
make intuitive sense to laymen and legal scholars alike. But the TTB
31
also prohibits labels that feature obscene or indecent representations.
These issues also arise more frequently than one might think. No
matter how comical or artistic, in order to gain label approval for
alcoholic beverages, their manufacturers are evidently required to
avoid sexual innuendos, nudity, expletives, and drug and addiction

28

Id.

29

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York,

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
30
27 C.F.R. § 7.29.
31

Id.§ 7.29(a)(3).

106

B

FA// 07-/1L///Fr

// /ROP/'

[V\, LlX

references.
But the lin betwen obscenity and art has long been a sub jectie
ightmnre. Objective cr1teria has leter truly beenh pferdb
he
federl
ge inent fo what does and does not constitute obscenil

the molst reliable advice miay well cmne froma Former Supremne Cunrt
Justice Potter Stewart iln a 1964 cas w henl he said simply. 1 know\ it
whean I see it ' ' IThel iBH
rationale for thc obscene remains simillyl
far from1 wel -Jrticulated andl many have argued its consisency suffers
for it Tis emates asituation in1 which not1 only is agovernnient ator
dieciing what is and is n1ot proper decorm, but that decision is also
lere luck of the draw in terms of which exainer
receives the
appliation. By no means i this a theoretical concern either, when
obscenity i in the eye of the beholder, inconsistencyis
evidented by the below
apprvals
and rejections.

___

A 1royed

___

ainevitable

as

Rejected

3L Sc ge y JaiObells v (hio ,7
US
184 (1U.S
(hoding
the
ls
Mlile him /ie /eets was not obscene and thus was onstutlinily protected by
the Fist \Anendme 0 nttaby the majority was unabl It gee upon a raioenale for
obscemty and ielded four diffeent opanons from the majority and two dissenng
oHinions, none of whicth had the suppot of l mo than Iwo justs)
For brewres, the see making the iall on hlfi of the federal gemnnent
was a single man for well ver a decade, Mr. Kent "bttlle" Matin, vs hird by the
'1113 in 20)4 and until his retirement in 2015 \1r Mar tin revewed every single mali
beverage Iabel applicanion submited to the Ilfi tbr label .pprm'al.

or

/ / (HOHBSENITY
I
20151Til P/?1VIE/

n'

10

Approved

107

Rejected

More impotanly . at first blush. the TFB's prohibition on the

government) and efect
obscene is similar in both source (fedl
(denied benfits based on use of a mark that is deemed obscene)as
The court in
those recenth helI unconstitutional by lam and lieta
Tam expresly limited its hokdng to the disparagment provision of
the I anham Act but anticpated the applicability elsewhere when it

[recogniv[cd] . that other portions of §2 may likewlise constitute
government egulation of expresion based on message, such as the
elusions of the imnmoral and scandalous nukt.I|' Taking their
argnument on its mintthe FlB ban on indecent and obsene labels also

"govenment

cnstitutes

regulation

of

expression

based

on

the sam mnesage bein regulated
Adktionally, it
sandalous and immoral
that it belies In re Tam
Whtie the USPTO has made cear
wrongly decided, even it w\as forced to concede that hlim precludes
the US. rademark Offie fm refusing registration to any mark that
likely to cause a
l under the interdicts of 2(a), and is al the no
reversal of. refuisalso ri'tustration to mar ks deemed 'scandalous or
1Thialins with the ederal Circuit stanc i In r bun
'~
mmlld
message

that

"

of the obscene,

Tarn ~

~

`08Idat13)iIL

Letter from Assistant Attorney Gieneral Joshua Salzman, an attorney
advising the D~irector ofthe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to a clerk for the Court
ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit in the pending Trademark Office appellate case In
re Brnetti (C AFC' No. 2015-1109) See generally Bob Cumbow, Govermnent
Concedes that Recent Federal Circuit Ruling on Regsration of ifsparaging"
Tradenarks Applies to "Scandalous and Inmoral" Marks As Wiel, IP LAw TkENo s:

108

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. XII

-

and follows sound logic.
The label approval process is analogous to that in the Pre-Tam
trademark application process in all of its most important aspects. In
both processes, businesses are required to undergo an approval process
in order to gain a benefit that is exceptionally beneficial, if not crucial
to the business's success. In the TTB proceeding, an approved label
gives the benefit of distribution and sales rights for the company's
goods in interstate commerce; in the USPTO proceeding, an approved
trademark application gives the benefit of exclusive use of a given
mark for the company's goods in interstate commerce. Neither benefit
is something that the company must have to operate as a business
trademark registrations are not required to use a given mark, nor do
breweries have to distribute their goods to others states (in fact many
breweries have no desire to grow outside of their backyard) - but in
both cases the benefit grants access to a valuable business practice. In
both processes, the approval is hinged on a government actor
determining whether expressive content is obscene. As such, the
TTB's ban on label approval for obscene and indecent marks is
essentially identical in source and effect as the ban on registration
implemented by the USPTO pre-Tam. Assuming the longevity of Tam,
the labeling process is thus arguably unconstitutional in identical
fashion.
B. Differentiatingthe TTB and USPTO
One possible rationale for differentiating the two processes, and
thereby validating the ban implemented by the TTB, is an increased
risk that consumers may infer government involvement or approval of
alcohol labels than with trademark registrations.
In Tam, the government suggested the prohibition on obscene
marks was outside the realm of constitutional protection under a theory
of trademark registration as "government speech." 3 7 The Tam court
rejected this notion however, noting that:

CONNECTING

THE

DoTS

(Jan.

27,

2016,

12:28

http://www.iplawtrends.com/govemment-concedes-that-recent-federal-circuitruling-on-registration-of-disparaging-trademarks-applies-to-scandalous-andimmoral-marks-as-well-0 1-27-2016/.
37
Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339.

PM),
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[T]he government appears to argue that trademark
registration and the accoutrements of registration
such as the registrant's right to attach the ®symbol to
the registered mark, the mark's placement on the
Principal Register, and the issuance of a certificate of
registration - amount to government speech. . . This
argument is meritless. Trademark registration is a
of
manifestations
These
activity.
regulatory
underlying
the
convert
not
do
registration
government
speech to government speech.38
The court laid out several reasons why the government's
argument failed, and many of these reasons translate to the TTB
labeling process as well. 39 This is because many elements of the label
approval process bear resemblance to the trademark registration
process and thus the Tam holding extends without effort. For example,
alcohol labels approved by the TTB are maintained on a public
database much like the public database maintained by the USPTO for
trademark registrations on the Principal Register.
But maintenance of a public database was found to be of little
persuasive value to the Tam court which held that "a registered mark's
placement on the Principal Register or publication in the PTO's
Official Gazette does not morph the private expression being registered
into government expression." 4 0 Rather, the court focused on the fact
that "[t]here is apparently no government-published book of all
trademark registrations; instead, the PrincipalRegister is at most an
4
internet database hosted on the PTO's website." 1 Perhaps most
tellingly, the court recognized that if the presence of 'speech' in a
government database qualified that language as government speech,
then the act of any licensing by the government would preclude First
Amendment protection. 42 Trademarks registered with the USPTO
38

39
40
41
42

Id. at 1345 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1345-55.
Id. at 1347.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 1347-48 ("If being listed in a government database or published

in a list of registrations were enough to convert private speech to government speech,
nearly every action the government takes-every parade permit granted, every
property title recorded, every hunting or fishing license issued-would amount to
government speech. The government could record recipients ofparade permits in an
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should have had a stronger claim to government speech than TTB label
approval, given the issuance of a certificate bearing an official
government seal. But even accepting that line of thinking, the
argument still failed because, according to Tam, "[t]he public simply
does not view these registration certificates as the government's
expression of its ideas or as the government's endorsement of the
ideas, inventions, or trademarks of the private speakers to whom they
are issued."4 3 Put another way, "the public is unlikely to believe that
a registered trademark designation accompanying a word or logo on a
product reflects government endorsement" and the same must surely
be said of alcoholic beverages considering the country's fraught
history with the products.4 4
The court repeatedly rejected the government's argument with
analogies to copyright law, recognizing that if the government's
argument was to be accepted, then by extension, materials subject to
copyright registration would also constitute government speech
immune to constitutional protection - a concept not proffered by any
party.4 5 This approach does not apply to the labeling laws universally
however. In refuting the government's position in Tam, the court took
into account the fact that
[t]he vast array of private trademarks are not created by
the government, owned or monopolized by the
government, sized and formatted by the government,
immediately understood as performing any government
function (like unique, visible vehicle identification),
aligned with the government, or (putting aside any
specific government secured trademarks) used as a
platform for government speech. There is simply no
meaningful basis for finding that consumers associate
registered private trademarks with the government....
The government argues that use of the @ symbol, being
official database or publish them weekly, thus insulating content-based grants of
these permits from judicial review. Governmental agencies could assign TV and
radio licenses and states could refuse to license medical doctors with no First
Amendment oversight by 'registering' these licenses in an online database, or by
allowing licensees to display a mark by their name").
43
Tam, 808 F.3d. at 1348.
44
Id. at 1347.
45
See id. at 1345-46.
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listed in a database of registered marks, and having
been issued a registration certificate makes trademark
registration government speech. These incidents of
registration do not convert private speech into
government speech. ... Markholders are not even
requiredto use the 8 symbol on theirgoods. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1111.46
One could argue, for example, that the TTB's mandated inclusion
of text titled in bold, capitalized letters "GOVERNMENT
WARNING," rises above the mere right to include the ®symbol. The
government warning is not only required per TTB regulations, but the
government even goes so far as to control the size and format. And
unlike the optional use of a registration symbol, the aforementioned
warning could easily be understood as a platform for government
47
speech given the heading "GOVERNMENT WARNING."
Even here, however, the argument can and should be refuted by
the TTB's own regulations. In addition to a ban on obscene material,
the TTB also bans, among other things, any material that simulates
48
government approval or involvement. By implication, even the TTB
46

Id. at 1346-47 (emphasis added).

47

27 C.F.R. §§ 16.20-16.22 (2016).

Id. at § 7.29(b) ("Simulation of Government stamps. No label shall be of
such design as to resemble or simulate a stamp of the United States Government or
of any State or foreign government. No label, other than stamps authorized or
required by the United States Government or any State or foreign government, shall
state or indicate that the malt beverage contained in the labeled container is brewed,
made, bottled, packed, labeled, or sold under, or in accordance with, any municipal,
State, Federal, or foreign government authorization, law, or regulation, unless such
statement is required or specifically authorized by Federal, State, or municipal, law
or regulation, or is required or specifically authorized by the laws or regulations of
the foreign country in which such malt beverages were produced. Ifthe municipal or
State government permit number is stated upon a label, it shall not be accompanied
by an additional statement relating thereto, unless required by State law."). See also
id. § 7.29(d) ("Flags, seals, coats of arms, crests, and other insignia. Labels shall not
contain, in the brand name or otherwise, any statement, design, device, or pictorial
representation which the appropriate TTB officer finds relates to, or is capable of
being construed as relating to, the armed forces of the United States, or the American
flag, or any emblem, seal, insignia, or decoration associated with such flag or armed
forces; nor shall any label contain any statement, design, device, or pictorial
representation of or concerning any flag, seal, coat of arms, crest or other insignia,
likely to mislead the consumer to believe that the product has been endorsed, made,
48
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does not actually presume that the presence of a government warning
on a label indicates inherently meaningful government approval or
involvement. Weighing the several factors mentioned by Tam in their
totality, it would seem that the same conclusion is warranted in
labeling laws as in trademark law; namely, that the public is unlikely
to believe a government warning upon an alcohol label reflects
government endorsement of the primary brand or its representations.
C. State LabelingLaws
It bears noting that TTB label approval is not required by the TTB
unless an alcoholic beverage enters interstate commerce and crosses
state lines. 4 9 Thus, many alcoholic beverages intended purely for
intrastate use are not subject to TTB review. That does not preclude
the issue, however, since many states independently mandate TTB
approval regardless of whether the beverage will leave the state of
manufacture. Of those states that do not mandate TTB approval, some
have relatively duplicative laws regarding alcohol labeling regardless,
while others states are in fact more stringent than the TTB - a problem
that is inherent when obscenity is within the eye of the beholder.
The fact remains however, that for breweries situated within a
state that does not mandate federal label approval and has either no
intention to package product or no intention to distribute across state
lines, the process we have been discussing is not necessary to carry on
business. But this argument also falls prey to Tam. Specifically, in
Tam, the government argued that the ban on disparaging trademarks
did not implicate the First Amendment because a trademark
registration is not required in order to use a mark, and thus it does not
prohibit speech.5 o But case law has made clear that the First
Amendment's standards, including those broadly invalidating message
discrimination, are not so limited because a denial of benefits creates a
serious disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem
offensive or disparaging. 5 ' This logic is no less applicable here as
or used by, or produced for, or under the supervision of, or in accordance with the
specifications ofthe government, organization, family, or individual with whom such
flag, seal, coat of arms, crest, or insignia is associated").
49
Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2012).
5o
Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339.
5i
See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The threat
to the First Amendment arises from the imposition of financial burdens that may have
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alcohol manufacturers are undoubtedly disincentivized from choosing
marks that may be interpreted by the TTB as obscene, since labels
bearing such marks will be rejected and incapable of use in interstate
commerce and possibly even intrastate commerce, depending on the
state of manufacture.
Moreover, many, if not most, breweries do have an intent to
package and distribute product in interstate commerce. So even for
those states that have created labeling laws not incorporating the TTB
regulations, the issue remains since any flouting of the labeling laws
essentially precludes later distribution of a product. This can be a bitter
trap for artisan manufacturers that did not accurately anticipate their
own growth. Alcohol manufacturers may gain local fame with a
particular brand only to find out much later that should they wish to
enter the national, or even regional scene, some beers would need to
be rebranded in order to gain the federal approval necessary for out-ofstate distribution. Rebranding is not only a large expense in terms of
financial investment, but can also have massively detrimental impacts
on the brand value associated with a beverage. It does a small craft
brewery little good to gain widespread local fame, enough to achieve
cult status, and then learn that their ticket to the big show is a flagship
beer that would have to be re-named and would thus go unrecognized.
A rebrand can easily negate any value of initial popularity altogether
2
and is thus analogous to the chilled trademark speech cited by Tam.)
Much like a trademark registration, the ability to distribute a particular
brand out-of-state "bestows truly significant and financially valuable
benefits upon" those with approved labels irrespective of the
opportunity for in-state sales. 53
Moreover, should a brewery find luck in the TTB label approval
process and pass the sniff test of federal regulations, individual state
regulators may yet reject certain labels for being obscene. For
example, Michigan based Founders Brewing Co. ran into issues when
the state of Alabama refused to approve labels for one of the brewery's
flagship beers, a scotch-style ale lovingly named Dirty Bastard, and a
specialty release, the barrel-aged Backwoods Bastard despite the

the effect of influencing or suppressing speech, and whether those burdens take the

form of taxes or some other form is unimportant").
52
53

See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1340.
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brewery's acquisition of TTB label approval.5 4 Somewhat ironically,
the state of Michigan (who evidently approved of the word "Bastard"
in Founders' case) initially denied Flying Dog the right to sell its
Raging Bitch IPA within the state.5 5 Nor is it purely a problem with
hops as Alabama drew yet more notoriety in 2004 after rejecting a
cabernet sauvignon label for CYCLES GLADIATOR made by Hahn
Family Wines.5 6 The label featured an artistic rendering of a nude
woman alongside a bicycle. It was found to be a violation of the
prohibition against "immodest or sensual" posing despite the artistic
lens.5 7 The woman is seen from the side and most, if not all, other states
and the TTB had approved the label without issue. Both of the above
breweries fought the decisions to censor their beer and in fact both
were eventually allowed to distribute in the states mentioned.
However, both businesses were forced to expend time and money
attempting to navigate these vague areas of law and defend what they
considered to be their constitutional right.
IV. BAD FROGS AND FLYING DOGS
As explored above then, the holding of Tam is applicable both in
its own internal logic and with regards to the rejected defenses
proffered by the government. As such, one might argue that the holding
in Tam can be applied in the state and federal labeling laws and the
prohibitions on obscenity should therefore be struck down as
unconstitutional. Should such a case be brought, the government may
well offer, if not different arguments, at least additional defenses
unique to the alcohol industry.
Specifically, alcohol's arguably internally dodgy constitutional
status may well provide a rationale for differentiating the validity of
obscenity prohibitions in alcohol labeling laws that are otherwise
The applicable ABC rule in Alabama reads: "The ABC Board may exercise
its discretion to prohibit advertising it considers objectionable." Ala. Alcohol
Beverage and Control Board Admin. Code r. 20-x-7-.01(b) (2001).
55
See Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 597 F. App'x.
342, 345 (6th Cir. 2015).
56
CYCLES GLADIATOR, Reg. No. 4,032,145.
5
AlabamaBans Wine with Naked Nymph on Label, NPR, July 30, 2009 5:39
PM,https://www.npr.org/sections/the two-way/2009/07/
alabama bans wine with naked n.html. Report on the rejection letters not publicly
available.
54
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unconstitutional with regards to the trademark framework or even
business practices in general. Post-prohibition regulations made clear
8
that alcohol licenses are a privilege, not a right.5 The Twenty-first
Amendment repealing the prohibition instituted by the Eighteenth
Amendment, did not allow alcohol manufacture and sales so much as
grant the states the right to allow "transportation or importation . . . or
possession" thereof.5 9 In fact, states may absolutely prohibit the
manufacture, transportation, sale, or possession of alcoholic
beverages. 6 0 Thus, it might go without saying that there is no right
inherent in the use of a particular label since there is no right to partake
of the underlying industry. States were granted broad discretion over
its regulation, and even legalization, of intoxicating beverages under
the police powers "[o]n account of [the] inherent and potential menace
to public welfare caused by [the] liquor business," and in fact courts
have recognized that the "police power to regulate and control [the
alcohol industry] runs broad and deep, much more so than the power
6
to curb and direct ordinary business activity." 1
Even if the rationale of Tam may well be readily translated to the
federal prohibitions then, one might argue that the states may retain
verbatim prohibitions under the broad protection of their police
powers. Essentially, one might argue that the state's exceptionally
potent police powers over alcohol trump alcohol manufacturer's free
First Amendment rights. Enter, once again, Raging Bitch IPA. As
indicated above, Flying Dog filed suit against the Michigan Liquor
Control Commission when its label for Raging Bitch IPA was rejected
See Brown Distrib. Co. v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 597
P.2d 324, 326 (Okla. 1979) (explaining that under the Twenty-first Amendment, state
"legislature[s] subject to constitutional restrictions, may lawfully grant right to
engage in traffic of liquor to certain class or classes of persons and withhold it from
others, and no one may complain because liquor legislation has denied him the
privilege of engaging in liquor traffic") (emphasis added); see also Cal. Const. art.
XX § 22 ("Until the Legislature shall otherwise provide, the privilege of keeping,
buying, selling, serving, and otherwise disposing of alcoholic beverages . .. and the
privilege of keeping, buying, selling, serving, and otherwise disposing of beers on
any premises open to the general public shall be licensed and regulated under the
applicable provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, insofar as the same are
not inconsistent with the provisions hereof').
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
59
60
See Francis v. Fitzpatrick, 129 Conn. 619 (1943).
61
Ruppert v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 138 Conn. 669, 674 (1952) (citing
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887)).
58
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for containing "language deemed detrimental to the health, safety, or
welfare of the general public." 62 Flying Dog maintained that rejection
of its label for such purposes was, much like in Tam, a violation of its
First Amendment free speech rights.
Initially, the district court hearing Flying Dog's case upheld the
label's rejection. 63 But, undeterred, Flying Dog appealed, and in March
2015, the 6 th Circuit Court of Appeals sided with beer. 64 Specifically,
the Flying Dog court cited the Supreme Court's application of the
CentralHudson test in a case banning inclusion of alcohol content on
beer labels. 65 In that case, Rubin v. CoorsBrewingCo., 6 6 the court held
that the speech was commercial in nature but the ban violated the First
Amendment by failing to satisfy the analytical framework set forth in
CentralHudson.67 More importantly, the court also held that "Rubin
resolved any doubt that First Amendment commercial speech
principles apply to the content of beer labels." 68 Since Ruben, case law
has frequently specified that First Amendment protection is not
negated by the Twenty-First Amendment.69
Thus, in Flying Dog, the court held that "'although the Twentyfirst Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on
a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating
beverages within its borders, the Amendment does not license the
States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the
Constitution.' Thus, the Twenty-first Amendment does not "diminish
the force" of the Supremacy Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment." 7 0
62

Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 597 F. App'x. 342,

346 (6th Cir. 2015).

Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 870 F.
Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Mich. 2012).
64
Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 343.
65
Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 353.
66
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
67
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 56263

65 (1980).
Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 354.
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996)
(finding Rihode Island's statutory ban on advertisements displaying accurate
information about retail prices of alcoholic beverages to be "an abridgement of
speech protected by the First Amendment" that was "not shielded from constitutional
scrutiny by the Twenty-first Amendment").
70
Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 354 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516
68
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In reaching their final holding, the Flying Dog court relied heavily on
Bad Frog. In Bad FrogBrewery, a district court upheld a rejection of
the brewery's beer label that showed a frog "giving the finger," only
7
to be reversed by the Second Circuit on the constitutional question.
The Flying Dog court also cited Bad Frog Brewery for
"persuasive authority that . . . banning a beer label for vulgarity
violates the First Amendment" and thus "any reasonable state liquor
commissioner is on notice that banning a beer label based on its content
would violate the First Amendment unless the CentralHudson test was
satisfied." 72 This case law makes clear, that whether alcohol
manufacture is a privilege or a right, alcohol labels are commercial
speech subject to CentralHudson scrutiny and, thus, any prohibitions
on obscene material must pass Central Hudson in order to be
constitutional.
While a thorough examination of CentralHudson is outside the
bounds of this article, a brief inspection indicates that to pass muster,
we must decide: (1) whether the speech at issue concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the asserted government
interest is substantial; and, if so, (3) whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 73 To the extent
that all fifty states have legalized the manufacture and sale of alcohol,
the first criterion is not reasonably within dispute. Rather, controversy
must hinge on whether a substantial government interest is implicated
and whether the regulation is both direct and narrow.
The government actor in Bad Frogis indicative of the usual state
stance with regard to interest, namely, the state's interest in "protecting
children from vulgar and profane advertising." 74 While the protection
of minors from obscene materials has long been deemed a substantial
interest of the state, 75 blanket bans on obscene alcohol labeling are, as
(1996)).
71

Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 91-100,

102-03 (2d Cir. 1998).
72

Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 355.
73
CentralHudson, 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980).
74
Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 98.
See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see
75
also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[W]e have
repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials").
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reiterated by Flying Dog, neither narrow nor direct enough to
withstand CentralHudson scrutiny.7 6 Rather, "[defendant's] complete
statewide ban on the use of Bad Frog's labels lack[ed] a 'reasonable
fit' with the state's asserted interest in shielding minors from vulgarity,
and [the defendant] gave inadequate consideration to alternatives to [ ]
blanket suppression of commercial speech." 77 This relatively wellsettled, if not thoroughly integrated, case law is not touched upon or
overthrown by the holding in Tam.
That being said, the law may yet be in flux. Turning to California,
we find Actmedia and Retail Digital Network. In the 1980s, an
advertising company leased advertising space on shopping carts at
grocery stores to alcoholic beverage manufacturers.7 This was found
to be a violation of the state's alcoholic beverage control act which
forbid an alcohol manufacturer from paying money or furnishing
anything of value to a retail licensee, such as a grocery store, for the
privilege of placing or painting a sign or advertisement in the retailer's
premises. 7 9 That law is still in effect today because, despite being
challenged on first amendment grounds, the court in Actmedia found
that the law passed CentralHudson muster. Specifically, the court held
that "like other tied-house statutes . . . section 25503(h) is primarily
designed to prevent or limit a specific evil: the achievement of
dominance or undue influence by alcoholic beverage manufacturers
and wholesalers over retail establishments." Protection from this
"specific evil," much like the protection of children from obscene
materials, had long been deemed valid as a substantial interest of the
state - namely, temperance. As the Actmedia court noted, drafters of
tied-house laws were concerned that a free market of advertising
alcohol would lead to market consolidation, manufacturer and
wholesaler dominance over retailers, and thus "incentives for retailers
to be far more aggressive in encouraging their customers to purchase
the alcoholic beverages they stocked. They feared that the increased
76
Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 369-71.
77
Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 101 ("[T]he government may not 'reduce the adult
population . .. to reading only what is fit for children"') (quoting Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp. 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)).
78
Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1986), implied
overrulingrecognized by Retail Digital Network LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638
(9th Cir. 2016) (requiring "heightened judicial scrutiny of content-based restrictions
on non-misleading commercial speech").

79

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25503(h) (West 1997).
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aggressiveness on the part of retailers, combined with the already
'overly aggressive marketing techniques' of the large [manufacturers]
who would pay to advertise in retail outlets . . . would increase
consumption of alcoholic beverages."so Finally, Actmedia found no
difficulty in holding that the statute was no more extensive than
necessary for its purpose since "to the extent that the California
legislature has determined that point-of-purchase advertising is a direct
cause of excessive alcohol consumption, limiting that advertising is
'obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach'
available." 8 1
Actmedia stood in solidarity with labeling regulations for some
time lending credence to the validity of regulating alcohol advertising
generally. However, a contender has arisen in this arena as well. Retail
DigitalNetwork, another advertising company, sought to install video
display units in off-premise retail locations with the idea of selling
2
advertising space to alcohol manufacturers. 8 The Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control cited Actmedia though and advised them
that such would be in violation of the ABC Act. Like its analog
predecessor, the advertising company sued alleging First Amendment
violations. 83 The trial court granted summary judgment based on
Actmedia but, unperturbed, this advertiser sought review in the Ninth
Circuit arguing that the Supreme Court case of Sorrell V IMS Health,
Inc. established a new level of scrutiny in commercial speech cases.
Specifically, Sorrell created "heightened scrutiny" and Actmedia 's
holding was irreconcilable with it. 8 4 Somewhat surprisingly, the three
member panel agreed with the advertiser and held that intermediate
scrutiny in cases such as these have now give way to Sorrell's
"heightened scrutiny." 85
In remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit noted the state's "broad
goal of 'temperance' [] remains 'a valid and important interest of the
state under the Twenty-first Amendment"' but expressed skepticism
on whether the content-based burdens of expression regarding point of
Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 966.
Id. at 967 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
507 (1981)).
82
See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir.
2016).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 645.
85
Id. at 653.
80
81
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sale advertising directly advanced that goal or did so in a permissible
fashion.86 One such reason for this skepticism was the "increasing
number of statutory exceptions to section 25503(f)-(h)" that the state
has evidently deemed acceptable - a trend that is arguably present with
regards to obscenity restrictions as well as evidenced by Tam, Raging
Bitch, and Bad Frog.8 7 The Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control
has petitioned for re-hearing of the case en banc, but the big question
in the interim remains - what exactly does "heightened scrutiny" mean
for alcohol manufacturers?" Sorrell may well mark the abandonment
of Central Hudson for commercial speech regulations, and with it
much of the rationale for labeling regulations prohibiting obscene
material but the hammer will likely need to fall with regard to pure
retail advertising first. Only after escaping the puritan values of
temperance that CentralHudson has long upheld can obscenity hope
to sneak in the backdoor.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Tam does not directly apply to the TTB, but the
Federal Circuit's ruling - that a government ban on expressive
content with a particular message is unconstitutional if the ban
deprives an applicant of a substantial benefit - could. Meanwhile,
similar state prohibitions, seemingly outside such constraints
previously, is also under attack. As such, decades worth of case law
may be ready to give way that could potentially allow alcohol
manufacturers breathing room in their very crowded marketing efforts.
Until such time however, alcohol manufacturers must leave the moral
low-ground on tap and off packaging.
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The court has not yet acted on the petition, but has granted requests
from a
number of parties to appear as amici, including: California Craft Brewers
Association, National Beer Wholesalers Association, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of
America, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of California, and California Beer & Beverage
Distributors.
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